Model
Sub-technique of AML.T0010 AI Supply Chain Compromise
Description
AI-enabled systems often rely on open-source models in various ways.
Most commonly, the victim organization may be using these models for fine-tuning.
These models will be downloaded from an external source and then used as the base for the model as it is tuned on a smaller, private dataset.
Loading models often requires executing some saved code in the form of a saved model file.
These can be compromised with traditional malware, or through some adversarial AI techniques.
- ATLAS ID
- AML.T0010.003
- Maturity
- RealizedUsed by real adversaries against AI systems in the wild.
- Platforms
- Predictive AIGenerative AIAgentic AI
Mitigations
- AML.M0005Control Access to AI Models and Data at Rest
Access controls can prevent tampering with ML artifacts and prevent unauthorized copying.
- AML.M0006Predictive AI Ensembles
Using multiple different models ensures minimal performance loss if security flaw is found in tool for one model or family.
- AML.M0008Validate AI Model
Ensure that acquired models do not respond to potential backdoor triggers or adversarial influence.
- AML.M0013Code Signing
Enforce properly signed model files.
- AML.M0017AI Model Distribution Methods
An adversary could repackage the application with a malicious version of the model.
- AML.M0035AI Red Team
Introduce a controlled untrusted or modified model through representative acquisition and deployment paths. Verify provenance, scanning, signing, approval, isolation, and rollback.
Case studies that use it
- AML.CS0013Backdoor Attack on Deep Learning Models in Mobile Apps
- AML.CS0019PoisonGPT
- AML.CS0023ShadowRay: Hijacking Exposed Ray Clusters
- AML.CS0027Organization Confusion on Hugging Face
- AML.CS0064Poisoned GGUF Templates: Inference-Time Supply Chain Attack
- AML.CS0065Model Namespace Reuse Supply Chain Attack