Indirect
Sub-technique of AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection
Description
An adversary may inject prompts indirectly via a separate data channel that the LLM or AI agent ingests, such as text or multimedia pulled from documents, emails, databases or websites. These instructions originate from adversary-controlled content rather than the legitimate user, and are frequently hidden or obfuscated (See LLM Prompt Obfuscation) from the user, for example as invisible text.
Adversaries may use this to hijack an agent or LLM in order to gain a foothold in the target system or to act against an unwitting user of that system, inheriting whatever privileges the AI system holds. Adversaries may also stage the lure that causes the content to be reached (See AI Agent Clickbait), or use the resulting foothold to establish persistence (See AI Agent Context Poisoning).
Indirect prompt injections have been observed in the wild, with potential impact ranging from harmless pranks, to search engine optimization manipulation, data exfiltration, and destructive actions.[[google-prompt-injections-web]]
- ATLAS ID
- AML.T0051.001
- Maturity
- DemonstratedShown to work in research or red-team exercises.
- Platforms
- Generative AIAgentic AI
Mitigations
- AML.M0024AI Telemetry Logging
Telemetry logging can help identify if unsafe prompts have been submitted to the LLM.
- AML.M0033Input and Output Validation for AI Agent Components
Validation can prevent adversaries from executing prompt injections that could affect agentic workflows.
- AML.M0035AI Red Team
Place controlled malicious instructions in external or retrieved content processed by the system. Improve content trust boundaries, retrieval controls, instruction isolation, and restrictions on resulting actions.
Case studies that use it
- AML.CS0020Indirect Prompt Injection Threats: Bing Chat Data Pirate
- AML.CS0021ChatGPT Conversation Exfiltration
- AML.CS0026Financial Transaction Hijacking with M365 Copilot as an Insider
- AML.CS0029Google Bard Conversation Exfiltration
- AML.CS0035Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via Indirect Prompt Injection
- AML.CS0038Planting Instructions for Delayed Automatic AI Agent Tool Invocation
- AML.CS0039Living Off AI: Prompt Injection via Jira Service Management
- AML.CS0040Hacking ChatGPT's Memories with Prompt Injection
- AML.CS0045Data Exfiltration via an MCP Server used by Cursor
- AML.CS0046Data Destruction via Indirect Prompt Injection Targeting Claude Computer-Use
- AML.CS0048Exposed ClawdBot Control Interfaces Leads to Credential Access and Execution
- AML.CS0049Supply Chain Compromise via Poisoned ClawdBot Skill
- AML.CS0051OpenClaw Command & Control via Prompt Injection
- AML.CS0054Data Exfiltration via Remote Poisoned MCP Tool
- AML.CS0055AI ClickFix: Hijacking Computer-Use Agents Using ClickFix
- AML.CS0063Prompt-Based Attacks Against Gemini via Calendar Invitations
- AML.CS0066ZombieAgent: Data Exfiltration Attack on ChatGPT
- AML.CS0067Claude Code GitHub Action Secret Exposure