Stage Capabilities
Description
Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed (Develop Capabilities) or obtained (Obtain Capabilities) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them. Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub, model registries, such as Hugging Face, or container registries.
Adversaries may stage a variety of AI Artifacts including poisoned datasets (Publish Poisoned AI Artifacts: Datasets, malicious models (Publish Poisoned AI Artifacts: Models, and prompt injections. They may target names of legitimate companies or products, engage in typosquatting, or use hallucinated entities (Discover LLM Hallucinations).
- ATLAS ID
- AML.T0079
- Maturity
- RealizedUsed by real adversaries against AI systems in the wild.
- Platforms
- Enterprise
Mitigations
ATLAS 2026.09 lists no mitigation for this technique.
Case studies that use it
- AML.CS0021ChatGPT Conversation Exfiltration
- AML.CS0041Rules File Backdoor: Supply Chain Attack on AI Coding Assistants
- AML.CS0045Data Exfiltration via an MCP Server used by Cursor
- AML.CS0050OpenClaw 1-Click Remote Code Execution
- AML.CS0051OpenClaw Command & Control via Prompt Injection
- AML.CS0055AI ClickFix: Hijacking Computer-Use Agents Using ClickFix
- AML.CS0057Storm-2139 Azure OpenAI Guardrail Bypass
- AML.CS0059EchoLeak: Zero-Click Prompt Injection Targeting M365 Copilot for Data Exfiltration
- AML.CS0061AI in the Middle: Web-Based AI Services as C2 Relays
- AML.CS0066ZombieAgent: Data Exfiltration Attack on ChatGPT
- AML.CS0072AI Recommendation Poisoning via Crafted AI Assistant Links