Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application
Description
An adversary may introduce malicious prompts into the victim's system via a public-facing application with the intention of it being ingested by an AI at some point in the future and ultimately having a downstream effect. This may occur when a data source is indexed by a retrieval augmented generation (RAG) system, when a rule triggers an action by an AI agent, or when a user utilizes a large language model (LLM) to interact with the malicious content. The malicious prompts may persist on the victim system for an extended period and could affect multiple users and various AI tools within the victim organization.
Any public-facing application that accepts text input could be a target. This includes email, shared document systems like OneDrive or Google Drive, and service desks or ticketing systems like Jira. This also includes OCR-mediated infiltration where malicious instructions are embedded in images, screenshots, and invoices that are ingested into the system.
Adversaries may perform Reconnaissance to identify public facing applications that are likely monitored by an AI agent or are likely to be indexed by a RAG. They may perform Discover AI Agent Configuration to refine their targeting.
- ATLAS ID
- AML.T0093
- Maturity
- DemonstratedShown to work in research or red-team exercises.
- Platforms
- Generative AIAgentic AI
Mitigations
- AML.M0039AI Honeypots
Since honeypots capture real input, they can provide visibility into attacks and prompt payloads that are target-specific.
Case studies that use it
- AML.CS0016Achieving Code Execution in MathGPT via Prompt Injection
- AML.CS0026Financial Transaction Hijacking with M365 Copilot as an Insider
- AML.CS0029Google Bard Conversation Exfiltration
- AML.CS0037Data Exfiltration via Agent Tools in Copilot Studio
- AML.CS0038Planting Instructions for Delayed Automatic AI Agent Tool Invocation
- AML.CS0039Living Off AI: Prompt Injection via Jira Service Management
- AML.CS0040Hacking ChatGPT's Memories with Prompt Injection
- AML.CS0046Data Destruction via Indirect Prompt Injection Targeting Claude Computer-Use
- AML.CS0059EchoLeak: Zero-Click Prompt Injection Targeting M365 Copilot for Data Exfiltration
- AML.CS0060Cross-Site Scripting via Prompt Manipulation in Lenovo AI Chatbot
- AML.CS0063Prompt-Based Attacks Against Gemini via Calendar Invitations
- AML.CS0066ZombieAgent: Data Exfiltration Attack on ChatGPT
- AML.CS0067Claude Code GitHub Action Secret Exposure