Runtime Response
Sub-technique of AML.T0110 AI Agent Tool Poisoning
Description
Adversaries may poison the runtime response channel of a malicious or compromised AI agent tool by deliberately returning content intended to influence the model's subsequent reasoning, decisions, or actions. Poisoned responses may contain malicious instructions, deceptive data, fabricated errors, embedded resources, or other content designed to be treated as trusted context after an approved tool invocation.
Because tool responses are commonly incorporated into the model's context, an adversary may use them to direct the agent to invoke additional tools, access sensitive information, alter an ongoing workflow, or transmit data to an adversary-controlled destination. Poisoned instructions may be mixed with legitimate results so that the tool appears to operate normally. Responses may use structured or unstructured content, including text, images, resource links, embedded resources, or schema-conforming fields [[mcp-tools]][[owasp-tool-poisoning]].
- ATLAS ID
- AML.T0110.002
- Maturity
- FeasibleShown to be possible in principle (proof of concept).
- Platforms
- Agentic AI
Mitigations
ATLAS 2026.09 lists no mitigation for this technique; see the parent technique.
Case studies that use it
No ATLAS case study records this technique yet. Browse all case studies.