CAPEC-509: Kerberoasting
Description
Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.
- Likelihood of attack
- Not rated by MITRE
- Typical severity
- High
- Abstraction
- DetailedA low-level, detailed pattern, often for a particular technology.
Mechanism of attack: Subvert Access Control
Prerequisites
- The adversary requires access as an authenticated user on the system. This attack pattern relates to elevating privileges.
- The adversary requires use of a third-party credential harvesting tool (e.g., Mimikatz).
- The adversary requires a brute force tool.
Skills required
- Medium
Consequences
- Confidentiality
Gain Privileges
Mitigations
- Monitor system and domain logs for abnormal access.
- Employ a robust password policy for service accounts. Passwords should be of adequate length and complexity, and they should expire after a period of time.
- Employ the principle of least privilege: limit service accounts privileges to what is required for functionality and no more.
- Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible.
Related weaknesses (CWE)
ATT&CK techniques (CAPEC taxonomy mapping)
Across MITRE's defensive frameworks
Linked through the 1 ATT&CK technique above.
Counter with D3FEND
Defensive techniques MITRE D3FEND maps to the same ATT&CK techniques.
- D3-RTARPC Traffic Analysis1 shared
- D3-TBAToken-based Authentication1 shared
- D3-TBToken Binding1 shared
- D3-ANCIAuthentication Cache Invalidation1 shared
- D3-CCSACredential Compromise Scope Analysis1 shared
- D3-CHCredential Hardening1 shared
- D3-CRCredential Revocation1 shared
- D3-CROCredential Rotation1 shared
- D3-CTSCredential Transmission Scoping1 shared
- D3-DUCDecoy User Credential1 shared
- D3-MFAMulti-factor Authentication1 shared
- D3-RICReissue Credential1 shared