Create Remote Process via WMIC
Hypothesis and description
Adversaries may use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally, by launching executables remotely.The analytic CAR-2014-12-001 describes how to detect these processes with network traffic monitoring and process monitoring on the target host. However, if the command line utility wmic.exe is used on the source host, then it can additionally be detected on an analytic. The command line on the source host is constructed into something like wmic.exe /node:"\<hostname\>" process call create "\<command line\>". It is possible to also connect via IP address, in which case the string "\<hostname\>" would instead look like IP Address.
Although this analytic was created after CAR-2014-12-001, it is a much simpler (although more limited) approach. Processes can be created remotely via WMI in a few other ways, such as more direct API access or the built-in utility PowerShell.
- Platforms
- Windows
- Domain
- Host
- Subtypes
- Process
- Submitted
- 2016-03-28
- Contributors
- MITRE
ATT&CK coverage
| Technique | Tactics | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation | Execution | Low |
1 technique. Links open MITRE ATT&CK.
D3FEND techniques MITRE maps to this analytic
Data model references
Fields from the CAR data model (object/action/field) the analytic reads.
Pseudocode and implementations
Looks for instances of wmic.exe as well as the substrings in the command line:
* process call create
* /node:
processes = search Process:Create
wmic = filter processes where (exe == "wmic.exe" and command_line == "* process call create *" and command_line == "* /node:*")
output wmicSplunk version of the above pseudocode.
index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 Image="C:\\Windows\\*\\wmic.exe" CommandLine="* process call create *"|search CommandLine="* /node:*"EQL version of the above pseudocode.
process where subtype.create and
(process_name == "wmic.exe" and command_line == "* process call create ")
|filter command_line == "* /node:*"LogPoint version of the above pseudocode.
norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 image="C:\\Windows\\*\\wmic.exe" command="* process call create *" command="* /node:*"Across MITRE's defensive frameworks
Linked through the 1 ATT&CK technique above.
Counter with D3FEND
Defensive techniques MITRE D3FEND maps to the same ATT&CK techniques.
- D3-ANAAAdministrative Network Activity Analysis1 shared
- D3-CAAConnection Attempt Analysis1 shared
- D3-HBPIHardware-based Process Isolation1 shared
- D3-PSAProcess Spawn Analysis1 shared
- D3-SCASystem Call Analysis1 shared
- D3-EALExecutable Allowlisting1 shared
- D3-EDLExecutable Denylisting1 shared
- D3-SCFSystem Call Filtering1 shared
- D3-APCAApplication Protocol Command Analysis1 shared
- D3-CSPPClient-server Payload Profiling1 shared
- D3-NTCDNetwork Traffic Community Deviation1 shared
- D3-NTFNetwork Traffic Filtering1 shared