What is the security risk of using a public USB charging station ("juice jacking") and what controls mitigate it on both Android and iOS?
- A.C) The risk is limited to malware installation via ADB; iOS is fully immune because ADB is Android-only.
- B.B) Juice jacking only affects devices with unlocked bootloaders; standard production Android and iOS devices are immune.
- C.A) USB charging stations can present a data-capable interface; malicious stations can attempt to sync files, install apps, or exploit USB enumeration vulnerabilities. Both iOS ("Trust this computer?" prompt) and Android (USB debugging disabled by default + "Charging only" USB mode default) mitigate data transfer, and USB-C data blocking cables (charge-only cables with no data lines) eliminate the risk entirely.
- D.D) Modern USB-C standards require mutual authentication before any data transfer, so juice jacking is no longer possible on any device released after 2020.
Why C is correct