2010ICS / OTWiper / destructive
Stuxnet discovered
2010
Stuxnet became public in 2010 as the first widely known malware designed to sabotage physical processes. It spread through USB drives and Windows networks to find Siemens engineering software, then changed the logic on specific PLCs while showing operators normal readings. US ICS-CERT issued advisories to help asset owners detect it.
- Victim
- Industrial control systems running Siemens Step 7 and S7 PLCs
- Sector
- Energy and industrial control systems
- Public attribution
- No government has publicly claimed responsibility; this page makes no attribution.
- Malware
- Stuxnet
Impact
Showed that malware could cause physical effects in industrial processes, and changed how governments and industry approach OT security.
Root cause
Removable media crossing into isolated networks, unpatched Windows vulnerabilities, and PLCs that accepted logic changes without integrity checks.
Lessons learned: the controls it teaches
- An air gap is not a control by itself; manage removable media and transient devices.
- Verify PLC logic against known-good baselines and protect it from unauthorised change.
- Monitor the physical process independently of the HMI.