30 well-documented families, how they spread, their ATT&CK techniques, and how to detect and stop them
Exams such as Security+, CySA+ and CEH expect you to tell ransomware from a loader or a RAT, recognise how each gets in, and pick the controls that break the chain. Each profile lists the family's MITRE ATT&CK software entry and selected techniques, practical detection ideas and defences, and any documented law-enforcement disruption. The set covers 9 ransomware, 3 wiper, 6 loader / botnet, 5 rat / stealer, 1 dual-use tool, 5 ics / nation-state, 1 mobile spyware entries.
These profiles summarise what governments, MITRE ATT&CK and named security vendors have published about each malware family. Associated actors and attributions are theirs, reported as such. Figures appear only where a cited public source states them. Each profile is a study summary for defenders and exam candidates, deliberately without samples, indicators or operational detail; check the linked sources for the current picture before relying on any detail. Last reviewed 2026-10-25.
Showing 30 of 30 families
Also: WanaCrypt0r, WCry, WanaCry
WannaCry was a ransomware worm that spread across the world in May 2017 by exploiting a Windows SMBv1 vulnerability that Microsoft had patched two months earlier (MS17-010).
Ryuk was a human-operated ransomware family used in targeted, high-ransom attacks on large organisations, including hospitals.
Also: LockBit 2.0, LockBit 3.0, LockBit Black, ABCD
LockBit was a ransomware-as-a-service operation that, according to the 2023 joint advisory by CISA and partner agencies, was the most deployed ransomware variant worldwide in 2022.
Conti was a ransomware-as-a-service family that CISA, the FBI and the NSA warned about in a September 2021 joint advisory, which reported more than 400 attacks on US and international organisations at that time.
Also: Sodinokibi, Sodin
REvil, also called Sodinokibi, was a ransomware-as-a-service operation behind several of the most disruptive attacks of 2021, including the July 2021 attack that pushed ransomware through Kaseya's VSA remote-management software to managed service providers and their customers.
Also: ALPHV, Noberus
BlackCat, also known as ALPHV, was a ransomware-as-a-service family written in Rust that could encrypt Windows, Linux and VMware ESXi systems.
Also: Clop
Cl0p is a ransomware family whose operators became known for mass data-theft campaigns against managed file transfer products.
Also: Akira_v2
Akira is a ransomware family first seen in 2023 that targets Windows systems and, through a separate variant, Linux and VMware ESXi hosts.
Black Basta is a ransomware-as-a-service variant first identified in April 2022.
Also: ExPetr, Petrwrap, Nyetya, Diskcoder.C
NotPetya struck in June 2017.
Also: Disttrack
Shamoon, also called Disttrack, is destructive malware first reported in 2012 attacks on energy-sector organisations in the Middle East.
Also: DriveSlayer, Trojan.Killdisk
HermeticWiper is destructive malware found on systems in Ukraine on 23 February 2022, the eve of Russia's full-scale invasion.
Also: Geodo
Emotet began as a banking trojan and grew into one of the most widespread malware delivery services, renting access to infected computers to other criminals who installed loaders and ransomware.
Also: Totbrick, TSPY_TRICKLOAD
TrickBot started as a banking trojan and became a modular platform for credential theft, network reconnaissance and delivering ransomware such as Ryuk and Conti.
Also: Qbot, Pinkslipbot, QuackBot
QakBot began as a banking trojan in the late 2000s and became a major malware delivery botnet used by ransomware affiliates.
Also: BokBot
IcedID began as a banking trojan and was increasingly used as a loader that gave ransomware operators their first foothold.
Mirai is malware that turns internet-connected devices such as cameras and routers into a botnet used for distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
Also: Bugat v5
Dridex is a banking trojan, spread mainly through spam with malicious Office documents, that stole online banking credentials to make fraudulent transfers.
Agent Tesla is a .NET remote access trojan and information stealer sold to criminals as a service.
Also: RedLine
RedLine Stealer is an information stealer sold as malware-as-a-service.
Also: LummaC2, LummaStealer
Lumma Stealer, also called LummaC2, is an information stealer sold as malware-as-a-service that grew into one of the most used stealers.
Also: Bladabindi, Njw0rm, LV
njRAT is a remote access trojan written in .NET that has circulated freely for over a decade, so it is used by everyone from low-skill criminals to state-linked groups.
Also: Remcos RAT
Remcos is sold as legitimate remote control and surveillance software but is widely abused as a remote access trojan, delivered through phishing.
Cobalt Strike is a commercial tool built for red teams to emulate real attackers.
Also: W32.Stuxnet
Stuxnet, discovered in 2010, was the first widely known malware built to cause physical damage through industrial control systems.
Also: CrashOverride, Industroyer2
Industroyer, also called CrashOverride, was used in the December 2016 attack that cut power in part of Kyiv.
Also: TRISIS, HatMan
Triton is malware built to tamper with safety instrumented systems, the independent controllers that shut an industrial process down safely when something goes wrong.
Also: Black Energy
BlackEnergy started around 2007 as a criminal toolkit for DDoS attacks and evolved into a modular espionage platform.
Also: Solorigate
SUNBURST was a backdoor hidden inside legitimate, digitally signed updates of SolarWinds Orion network-management software in 2020.
Also: Pegasus for iOS, Pegasus for Android, Chrysaor
Pegasus is commercial spyware that, according to public reporting by Citizen Lab and others, has been used to monitor journalists, activists and politicians.
Software and technique identifiers and names are from MITRE ATT&CK®, used under the ATT&CK Terms of Use. Figures and attribution statements are those of the governments, MITRE and vendors cited on each profile, not CyberCertPrep's own assessments. Summaries, detection ideas and defensive guidance are original material written by CyberCertPrep. These pages contain no samples, indicators or code. CyberCertPrep is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE or any agency or vendor cited.