CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
Description
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
- Likelihood of attack
- High
- Typical severity
- High
- Abstraction
- StandardA specific methodology or technique used in an attack.
Mechanism of attack: Subvert Access Control
Prerequisites
- The application must be navigable in a manner that associates elements (subsections) of the application with ACLs.
- The various resources, or individual URLs, must be somehow discoverable by the attacker
- The administrator must have forgotten to associate an ACL or has associated an inappropriately permissive ACL with a particular navigable resource.
Skills required
- LowIn order to discover unrestricted resources, the attacker does not need special tools or skills. They only have to observe the resources or access mechanisms invoked as each action is performed and then try and access those access mechanisms directly.
Consequences
- ConfidentialityAccess ControlAuthorization
Gain Privileges
Mitigations
- In a J2EE setting, administrators can associate a role that is impossible for the authenticator to grant users, such as NoAccess, with all Servlets to which access is guarded by a limited number of servlets visible to, and accessible by, the user. Having done so, any direct access to those protected Servlets will be prohibited by the web container. In a more general setting, the administrator must mark every resource besides the ones supposed to be exposed to the user as accessible by a role impossible for the user to assume. The default security setting must be to deny access and then grant...
Related weaknesses (CWE)
- CWE-276Incorrect Default Permissions
- CWE-285Improper Authorization
- CWE-434Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
- CWE-693Protection Mechanism Failure
- CWE-732Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
- CWE-1191On-Chip Debug and Test Interface With Improper Access Control
- CWE-1193Power-On of Untrusted Execution Core Before Enabling Fabric Access Control
- CWE-1220Insufficient Granularity of Access Control
- CWE-1297Unprotected Confidential Information on Device is Accessible by OSAT Vendors
- CWE-1311Improper Translation of Security Attributes by Fabric Bridge
- CWE-1314Missing Write Protection for Parametric Data Values
- CWE-1315Improper Setting of Bus Controlling Capability in Fabric End-point
- CWE-1318Missing Support for Security Features in On-chip Fabrics or Buses
- CWE-1320Improper Protection for Outbound Error Messages and Alert Signals
- CWE-1321Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
- CWE-1327Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address
ATT&CK techniques (CAPEC taxonomy mapping)
Across MITRE's defensive frameworks
Linked through the 1 ATT&CK technique above.
Counter with D3FEND
Defensive techniques MITRE D3FEND maps to the same ATT&CK techniques.
- D3-SICASystem Init Config Analysis1 shared
- D3-SBVService Binary Verification1 shared
- D3-SFASystem File Analysis1 shared
- D3-AVEAsset Vulnerability Enumeration1 shared
- D3-RSRestore Software1 shared
- D3-SWISoftware Inventory1 shared
- D3-SUSoftware Update1 shared
- D3-DADynamic Analysis1 shared
- D3-EFAEmulated File Analysis1 shared
- D3-CIConfiguration Inventory1 shared
- D3-RCRestore Configuration1 shared
- D3-EALExecutable Allowlisting1 shared
Detect with CAR
MITRE CAR analytics that cover the same ATT&CK techniques.
- CAR-2014-07-001Service Search Path Interception1 shared
- CAR-2021-11-001Registry Edit with Creation of SafeDllSearchMode Key Set to 01 shared
- CAR-2014-02-001Service Binary Modifications1 shared
- CAR-2013-03-001Reg.exe called from Command Shell1 shared
- CAR-2020-05-003Rare LolBAS Command Lines1 shared
- CAR-2013-01-002Autorun Differences1 shared
- CAR-2013-04-002Quick execution of a series of suspicious commands1 shared